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THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SETS THE STAGE
FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE NEWSPERSON'S
SHIELD LAW IN DELANEY v.
SUPERIOR COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a reporter. You and a photographer, as part of
your research on a story, accompany a special police department task
force on their "beat." The task force was formed to help "clean up" the
city, and you have been assigned to watch them in action. During the
day, the police officers you are observing stop and question a young man
sitting on a bench. They search him and find that he is carrying a
weapon. The police arrest him. At his trial you and your photographer
are called to testify as to whether he consented to the police officers'
search. The question is: do you testify?
As a reporter, your code of ethics states that you "shall refuse to
reveal confidences or disclose sources of information in court or before
other judicial or investigatory bodies. . . ."' A reporter's exercise of this
code is protected from contempt citations in California, which had a
shield law in its Code of Civil Procedure as early as 1935.2 A shield law
is one which protects against citations for contempt of court.' In 1980,
following the transfer of the shield law from the California Code of Civil
Procedure to the California Evidence Code, and a series of legislative
changes, the newsperson's shield law, in substantially the same language,
was added as one of the California Constitution's provisions.4 Theoreti-
cally, as a reporter, you therefore have no problem in deciding whether
to testify: you simply refuse, on the basis of your code of ethics and the
California Constitution.
In practice, however, the decision of whether or not to testify is far
from simple. Despite a shield law which is "clear and unambiguous,"5
courts in California have repeatedly refused to give it effect,6 and they
1. American Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics, Canon 5; See also, Beaver, The News-
man's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 Or. L. Rev. 243
(1968).
2. CALIF. CODE OF CIv. PRO., Stat. 1935, ch. 532, § 1.
3. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
4. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b).
5. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 798, 789 P.2d 934, 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753,
760 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1972), cert.
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continue to enforce contempt citations against newspersons, even after
the law was elevated to constitutional status.7 The cases cite interests of
civil litigants and criminal defendants as justifications for overcoming the
immunity afforded newspersons by the shield law. In the face of such
wide recognition of countervailing interests, is the shield law a "shield"
at all? Or is the protection it affords merely illusory, because of the
courts' continuing repudiation of it?
The California Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to miti-
gate these concerns by either upholding the shield law itself, or formulat-
ing a standard for weighing interests so that at least in some cases, the
reporters' interest would prevail. The court unfortunately did not seize
this opportunity. In Delaney v. Superior Court' ("Delaney") the issue
was whether a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial can outweigh a
newsperson's shield law protection.9 The court held that the defendant's
rights can, and will, overcome the newsperson's protection, if the defend-
ant can show a reasonable possibility the information will materially as-
sist his defense."° The court's result once again knocks down shield law
immunity in favor of another interest, in this case a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial. " Further, the court used a conglomerate of the vari-
ous tests posited by the California Courts of Appeal in shield law cases,
none of which formulated a standard which would help preserve shield
law immunity.
This Note will analyze the Delaney decision in detail. It will de-
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 608 (1979); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988),
overruled by Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136
Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982), overruled by Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
3d 785 (1990); Liggett v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, rev.
granted, 263 Cal. Rptr. 119, 780 P.2d 349 (1989); New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 202
Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), rev. granted, 762 P.2d 442, 252 Cal. Rptr. 278,
reprinted for tracking pending review, as New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.
App. 3d 672, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426, aff'd, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11177 (Oct. 3, 1990); Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
8. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, rev. granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 277, 762 P.2d
441, reprinted for tracking pending review, as Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d
681, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988), superseded by 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1990).
9. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 792, 789 P.2d at 936-37, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
10. Id. at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767 (emphasis in original).
11. This phenomenon of favoring criminal defendants' and civil litigants' interests over
shield law immunity is also noted, with reference to California appellate decisions between
1971 and 1979, in Note, Pressing California Shield Law on Criminal Defendants: A Weighting
Game, 11 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 461 (Spr. 1989).
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scribe the history of the California shield law, and examine standards
used in cases decided under it. It will also evaluate the implications of
the standard formulated by the Delaney court, and whether it renders
moot a newsperson's shield law immunity from contempt, at least in a
criminal context. Finally, the possible effect of the Delaney decision on
shield law immunity in civil cases is discussed.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE-DELANEY V SUPERIOR COURT
A. Statement of Facts
In September, 1987 a new Long Beach Police Department task force
was patrolling downtown Long Beach, in an effort to "make this a desira-
ble place." 12 On September 23, Los Angeles Times reporter Roxana
Kopetman and photographer Roberto Santiago Bertero, real parties in
interest in Delaney, accompanied the task force.13 The officers saw Sean
Delaney and a friend sitting on a bench in the Long Beach Plaza mall.' 4
Both were "shabbily dressed."' 5 A plastic bag of a type often used to
store narcotics was protruding from Delaney's shirt pocket. 6 When the
officers asked about the contents of the bag, Delaney showed them it
contained a piece of gold and a piece of jewelry. 7 He said he intended to
pawn the items at the mall.18 The officers were suspicious because the
mall had no pawnshops.' 9 They asked Delaney for his identification, and
he reached for a jacket lying next to him on the bench.20 A police officer
ran his fingers along the outside of the jacket, and he felt a hard object in
its pocket.2' The officer reached inside and retrieved a set of brass
knuckles, which Delaney said was a key chain.22
Delaney was charged in a misdemeanor complaint with possession
of brass knuckles, in violation of California Penal Code § 12020(a).23 He
moved to suppress the evidence of the brass knuckles, saying that be-
cause he had not consented to the search of his jacket, the seizure of the
12. Kopetman, L.B. Police Task Force Aims To Keep Transients, Thieves on the Move-
Away From Downtown, L.A. Times, Southeast edition, Sep. 27, 1987, § IX, at 1, col. 1.
13. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
14. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
15. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
16. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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knuckles was illegal.24 According to the officers, Delaney had consented
to the search of his jacket.25
On September 27, 1987 Kopetman published an article in the Los
Angeles Times about the Long Beach police task force.26 The article de-
scribed Delaney and his friend, included a photograph of them, and con-
tained information about their contact with the officers and the discovery
of the gold and jewelry.27 The article did not, however, mention whether
Delaney consented to the search of his jacket.2"
B. Procedural History
Delaney subpoenaed Kopetman and Bertero to testify at the munici-
pal court hearing on the issue of whether he could suppress the evidence
obtained through the allegedly illegal search (that is, the brass knuck-
les).29 The reporters 30 moved to quash the subpoena, contending that
"they could not be compelled to testify because their eyewitness observa-
tions of the public search and seizure constituted 'unpublished informa-
tion' protected by the newspersons' shield law from disclosure."31 The
court denied the reporters' motions.32
At the suppression hearing, the reporters were called to testify.3
They testified that they observed the search in question, and were in a
position to observe whether Delaney had consented to it.34 However,
they refused to reveal their unpublished observations. The municipal
court held the shield law inapplicable to the reporters' eyewitness obser-
vations of the public search and seizure, and held that even if it did ap-
ply, Delaney's need for the testimony outweighed the reporters' shield
law immunity.35 The judge cited the reporters for contempt.36 The re-
porters filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in superior court. The
24. Id. at 793-94, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
25. Id. at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
26. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
27. Kopetman, LB. Police Task Force Aims To Keep Transients, Thieves on the Move-
Away From Downtown, L.A. Times, Southeast edition, Sep. 27, 1987, § IX, at 1, col. 1. See
also, Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
28. Id.
29. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
30. The term "reporter" will be used throughout to indicate any person specified in the
shield law as being entitled to its protection.
31. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Id.
35. Id., 789 P.2d at 937-38, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
36. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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superior court granted their petitions. 7 Delaney and the Long Beach
City Prosecutor filed a joint petition in the court of appeal seeking to
vacate the superior court's orders granting the reporters' habeas corpus
petitions. 8
The court of appeal held that the "unpublished information" provi-
sions of the shield law do not apply to compelled eyewitness testimony
regarding a public event,39 and ordered the superior court to vacate the
orders granting the reporters habeas corpus.' ° The California Supreme
Court modified this holding, and concluded that "the shield law's broad
definition of 'unpublished information' does not require a showing by the
newsperson that the information was obtained in confidence."4 They
further held "that a newsperson's protection under the shield law must
yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial when the
newsperson's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on
that right."
4 2
III. THE HISTORY OF THE NEWSPERSON'S SHIELD LAW IN
CALIFORNIA
A. Legislative History
California's first shield law was enacted in 1935 as an amendment to
Code of Civil Procedure § 1881.11 This statute immunized newspaper
employees from being held in contempt for nondisclosure of their
sources.' It was amended in 1961 to provide broader immunity,4" and
then in 1965 its text was moved to Evidence Code § 1070.' Through a
series of amendments, 47 the immunity from contempt has been extended
to publishers, editors, radio and television reporters, and other persons
associated with newspapers, magazines, periodicals, press associations,
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
40. Id
41. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
42. Id.
43. Codified in CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 1881(6) (West 1955); Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at
795, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
44. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 795, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
45. Stats. 1961, ch. 629, § 1, amending Stats. 1935, ch. 532, § 1.
46. For comprehensive histories of the newsmen's shield law in California, see Sipos, Cali-
fornia's "New" Newsmen's Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 221 (1986) and Kevane, The Newsgatherer's Shield-Why Waste
Space in the California Constitution? 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527, 533 (1985).
47. See Stats. 1971, ch. 1717, § 1; Stats. 1972, ch. 1431, § 1; and Stats. 1974, ch. 1456, § 2.
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television and radio.48
In the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes,49 the United States
Supreme Court was asked to interpret the first amendment to grant
newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.5° A
plurality of the Court declined to do so.5 However, the Court also
stated that it was "powerless to bar state courts from responding in their
own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a
newsman's privilege." 2 The California Legislature's 1974 amendment to
California Evidence Code § 1070 was apparently in response to
Branzburg.53 This amendment extended the shield law protection not
only to "sources" of information, but also to "unpublished
information.
5 4
The Evidence Code provision was made part of the California Con-
stitution by Proposition 5 in the June 3, 1980 primary election. 5 Evi-
dence Code § 1070 and California Constitution article I, § 2(b) ("article
I, § 2(b)") are identical except for insignificant differences in wording. 6
For example, Evidence Code § 1070 states that a newsperson "cannot be
adjudged in contempt," while article I, § 2(b) states that a newsperson
"shall not be adjudged in contempt. '5 7 Article I, § 2(b) provides in part:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication... shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial,
legislative, or administrative body, or any other body having
the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source
of any information procured.., for publication in a newspaper,
magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in
gathering, receiving or processing of information for communi-
cation to the public ....
As used in this subdivision, 'unpublished information' includes
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1988).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
50. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 706.
53. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 796, 789 P.2d at 939, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
54. Id.
55. Assem. Const. Amend. No. 4, Stats. 1978 (1977-78 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 77, at 4819-20;
Note, Pressing California Shield Law on Criminal Defendants: A Weighting Game, 11 HAS-
TINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 461, 470 (Spr. 1989).
56. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 796, 789 P.2d at 939, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1988), CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b) (emphasis added to
each).
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information not disseminated to the public by the person from
whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information
has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all
notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data... whether or
not published information based upon or related to such material
has been disseminated.58
The intent of the constitutional provision was to strengthen the shield
law.5 9 Its practical effect was to make it harder for California courts to
overcome shield law protection and compel disclosure."
B. California Courts Created Exceptions to the Statutory Shield Law
On four separate occasions, California appellate courts refused to
uphold shield law immunity under Evidence Code § 1070 by carving ex-
ceptions out of the protection provided by the statute.61 These excep-
tions were related to criminal defendants' rights, and an examination of
them is necessary to properly analyze Delaney.
1. Evidence Code § 1070 is Inapplicable When a Court Investigates
Possible Violations of its Orders Barring Potentially
Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity62
Farr v. Superior Court6" ("Farr"), grew out of the 1970 trial of
Charles Manson and his codefendants for two sets of multiple murders."
In the much-publicized Manson case, an Order re Publicity, a protective
order prohibiting the release of testimony or evidence that might be given
at trial, became effective on December 10, 1969.65 During the trial, Vir-
ginia Graham, a potential witness, recited in a written statement that one
of Manson's codefendants, Susan Atkins, had confessed "in lurid detail"
58. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
59. Kevane, The Newsgatherer's Shield- Why Waste Space in the California Constitution?
15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527, 546 (1985).
60. Id.
61. See Note, Pressing California Shield Law on Criminal Defendants: A Weighting Game,
11 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 461, 478 (Spr. 1989) and Sipos, California's "New" Newsmen's
Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 219,
221 (1986). The four cases creating exceptions to § 1070 are: Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1975); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978);
Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
62. Kevane, The Newsgatherer's Shield-Why Waste Space in the California Constitution?
15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527, 545 (1985).
63. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
64. Id. at 63-4, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
65. Id. at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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that she and her codefendants had "planned to murder a series of show
business personalities each in a particularly vicious and bizarre man-
ner."" One copy of the statement, edited to exclude inadmissible testi-
mony, was delivered to each defense attorney, all of whom were subject
to the protective order.67 William T. Farr, a Los Angeles Herald Exam-
iner reporter, sought and received copies of the statement.6" Upon learn-
ing that Farr had the statement, the judge presiding over the Manson
trial held an in-chambers hearing.69 At the hearing, Farr refused to re-
veal his sources for the statement, asserting immunity under § 1070.70
After Manson, Atkins and the other codefendants were found
guilty, the trial court held a "hearing to determine the source of Farr's
Herald Examiner story recounting the Graham statement. ' 71 At issue
was whether the violation of the order had jeopardized the defendants'
right to a fair trial.72 Upon his refusal to reveal his sources, Farr was
held in contempt. 73 The California Court of Appeal upheld the judg-
ment of contempt,74 stating that to grant immunity to Farr would be an
"unconstitutional interference by the legislative branch with an inherent
and vital power of the court to control its own proceedings and of-
ficers."7  The court further stated that allowing immunity in this case
would violate the principle of separation of powers. 6 The court held
that it must balance "the interest to be served by disclosure of source
against its potential inhibition upon the free flow of information," and
then concluded that, in this case, Farr was not entitled to the immunity
afforded him in Evidence Code § 1070.77
In Rosato v. Superior Court ("Rosata ,,),78 the trial court issued a gag
order 79 prohibiting individuals connected to a criminal proceeding in-
volving bribery and conspiracy charges against officials of the city of
66. Id
67. Id
68. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
69. Id. at 64-5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
70. Id. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
71. Id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
72. Id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
73. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
74. Id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
75. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
76. Id. at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
77. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
78. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
79. A gag order is "a court-imposed order to restrict information or comment about a
case. The ostensible purpose of such an order is to protect the interests of all parties and
preserve the right to a fair trial by curbing publicity likely to prejudice a jury." BARRON'S
LAW DICTrONARY 201 (2d ed. 1984).
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Fresno from releasing information about the case.8I The grand jury tran-
scripts which led to the defendants' indictments were also sealed."' After
stories quoting extensively from the sealed grand jury transcript ap-
peared in the Fresno Bee, the court convened a hearing concerning the
apparent violation of its orders.8 2 Fresno Bee reporters and editors were
questioned at the hearing regarding the source of their information. 3
When they refused to answer, the trial court held them in contempt."
The court of appeal upheld the contempt citations.85
As in Farr,6 the Rosato court acknowledged that the legislature's
recognition of the importance of maintaining a free flow of information
was embodied in § 1070.87 The Rosato court went on, however, to con-
sider two limitations on § 1070.88 First, § 1070 cannot apply to shield
newspersons from "testifying about criminal activity in which they have
participated or which they have observed."89 The court supported this
limitation by analogizing to other areas in which such a limitation has
applied to deny a statutory immunity from contempt. 9° Second, the
court applied the limitation enunciated in Farr, that of the inherent
power of the judiciary to control its own proceedings and officers.91 The
Rosato court found that:
The key to the court's power to compel [disclosure] in the case
at bench in the face of Evidence Code section 1070 is the neces-
sity of exploring the violation of its orders by those subject
thereto as a means of enforcing the court's constitutional obli-
gation to prevent prejudicial publicity from emanating from its
officers.92
Therefore, the shield law does not apply when "questions asked may tend
to identify who, if anyone, among those subject to a court's order, may
have violated it."93 The court's contention that the shield law still pro-
80. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 199-201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34; Real Parties in Interest's
Opening Brief on the Merits at 18, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (No. S006866)
(hereinafter, Real Parties in Interest's Opening Brief).
81. Real Parties in Interest's Opening Brief at 18.
82. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
83. Real Parties in Interest's Opening Brief at 19.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
87. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
88. Id. at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
91. Id. at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
92. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 222, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
93. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (emphasis in original).
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tects against the compelled disclosure of sources other than those subject
to protective orders94 may have been a token reassurance to the press,
because the Rosato court nevertheless pierced another hole in § 1070's
shield protection.
2. Evidence Code § 1070 Does Not Apply if the Identity of the
Newsperson's Sources Has Already Been Revealed95
In CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court,96 criminal defendants charged with
selling PCP, also known as angel dust, subpoenaed petitioner CBS to
produce "certain video tapes, tape recordings and motion pictures of
three meetings between the defendants and narcotics officers of the Santa
Clara Sheriff's Department on August 12, 1977, between 8:00 and 9:15
p.m."97 CBS had compiled the materials as part of a "60 Minutes" pro-
gram segment.98 CBS moved to quash the subpoena, relying in part on
the immunity afforded by § 1070. 99 CBS argued that under § 1070 they
did not have to produce unpublished material such as outtakes."° The
court, however, found the unpublished nature of the outtakes "insignifi-
cant" because CBS had failed to explain "what of substance in the mater-
ials sought to be produced has not already been revealed." 1°1 This
finding was based on the fact that the confidentiality which CBS had
promised the officers in getting permission to tape the events in the first
place had already been lost when the officers revealed their identities at
trial.1"2 The court denied CBS's motion and ordered CBS to produce
video and audio tapes, photographs, and outtakes of the meetings."0 3
The CBS court stated that, in balancing the right of "newsgather-
ing" against the defendants' right to a fair trial, the "necessity of permit-
ting discovery becomes clear."" The court also articulated the standard
that "where a criminal defendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibil-
ity that evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exoneration,
94. Id.
95. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978), rev'd,
Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 246, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
98. Id.
99. Id., 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
100. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426. An outtake is "a scene, or
take, photographed for a motion picture or television show, but not included in the shown
version." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1011 (2d ed. 1978).
101. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 247, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
104. Id. at 251-52, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
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he is entitled to its discovery."105
3. Even Where § 1070 Applies, the Immunity It Provides a
Newsperson Must Yield Where a Criminal Defendant
Demonstrates a Need for the Information Sought
to be Disclosed
In Hammarley v. Superior Court ("Hammerly"),'° the California
Third District Court of Appeal upheld a contempt judgment against a
Sacramento Union news reporter when he refused to comply with an or-
der to produce for the court's in camera inspection tapes, notes and tran-
scriptions of interviews with an individual who had eyewitnessed and
participated in a murder.'o7 The reporter, John Hammarley, had written
four articles about murders allegedly committed by members of the
"Mexican Mafia."'108 The articles contained statements by Edward Gon-
zales, a self-confessed former member of the "Mexican Mafia," implicat-
ing defendants in the murder of Ellen Delia."° Gonzales, a key witness
for the prosecution, had assumed a new identity in another state, where
he was protected from retaliation by his former associates." 0
The Hammarley court held that defendants had satisfied a three-
prong test to overcome Hammarley's claim of § 1070 immunity. De-
fendants had shown that (1) the evidence sought was "relevant and nec-
essary" to their case; (2) the evidence was "not available from a source
less intrusive" upon the § 1070 immunity; and (3) there was a "reason-
able possibility that the evidence sought might result" in their exonera-
tion. " Therefore, the judgment of contempt was valid. The court
supported its decision by stating that "[t]he state may not abridge a de-
fendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by denying the accused access
to all evidence that can throw light on the issues in the case ....
105. Id., 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (citing People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523, 113 Cal. Rptr.
825, 522 P.2d 1 (1974); Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr.
233 (1969)) (emphasis in original).
106. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
107. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 392-94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
108. Id. at 392-93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 393, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
111. Id. at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
112. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 401-02, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (citing People v. Riser,
47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956)).
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C. Civil Cases Dealing With California's Constitutional Shield Law
Did Not Require Disclosure
The first reported case to confront the shield law in its constitutional
form was KSDO v. Superior Court ("KSDO "). a 11 KSDO involved a civil
suit for libel and violation of civil rights."' Plaintiffs, members of the
Riverside County Police Department, sued, among others, KSDO radio
station and Hal Brown, a reporter for KSDO, over a broadcast about an
investigation into allegations of "transportation of large amounts of her-
oin from Tijuana to Riverside by city police in official cars."' 5 During
his deposition, Brown revealed his sources for the broadcast. "16 The trial
court granted the police officers' motion for disclosure of Brown's notes
and memoranda of his conversations with the sources." 7 The defend-
ants petitioned for a writ of mandate/prohibition to prevent the enforce-
ment of the trial court's order."' The court of appeal said the shield law
provided an immunity from contempt, not a privilege against disclo-
sure." 9 Because petitioner had not been threatened with or cited for
contempt, the shield law did not apply. 2
The KSDO court then looked to the first amendment to determine
whether an order compelling discovery was appropriate. 2 ' The court
formulated a factual analysis for deciding whether to compel disclosure
of a newsperson's information. 22 This factual analysis balanced several
factors: "(1) the nature of the proceeding, (2) the status of the newsper-
son as a party or nonparty, (3) alternative sources of the information, and
(4) the relationship of the information to the heart of the claim." 2 ' The
court found that the plaintiffs failed to show the information they sought
was unavailable from other sources, and that the materials actually went
to the heart of the claim.'24 Therefore, although the shield law did not
apply, Brown was entitled to a qualified privilege under the first amend-
ment, and not required to disclose his information.
25
113. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
114. Id. at 377, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
115. Id. at 377-78, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
116. Id. at 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
117. Id.
118. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
119. Id. at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (citing Comment, Newsmen's Immunity Needs a Shot
in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 56, 68 (1970)).
120. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
125. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court 126 the court of appeal
decided whether "the interest of a nonparty publisher in asserting [shield
law] protection ... overcome[s] the competing interests of civil litigants
in obtaining [the publisher's information].'" 27 The court concluded that
civil litigants have neither constitutional nor other legal rights sufficient
to overcome shield law protection. 21 In Playboy, Cheech & Chong, a
comedy team, sued their former accountants, financial advisors and busi-
ness managers for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.
129
Playboy magazine published an article based on an interview with
Cheech & Chong. 30 During discovery, the defendants sought disclosure
of materials related to the interview, which allegedly included statements
made by Cheech that he later denied.' The trial court ordered
disclosure.'
32
The court of appeal denied disclosure, however, by vacating the su-
perior court's order. 133 First, the court held that the materials requested
fell within the protection of the shield law, since "unpublished informa-
tion," as that term is used in article I, § 2(b), refers to "factual informa-
tion that is within the newsperson's knowledge, whether contained in
source material or in memory."' 34 Second, the court stated that the rule
enunciated in KSDO' 35 would "eviscerate the newsperson's protec-
tion." ' 36 The court stated:
If every civil litigant who postulates that some information ma-
terial to his case is contained within the undisseminated materi-
als of a newsperson may compel that nonparty newsperson to
present his information to the trial court for inspection, balan-
cing of interests, and probable disclosure, the protection af-
forded newspersons would be greatly reduced, if not wholly
vitiated. 1
37
Therefore, Playboy created a conflict among the California Courts of Ap-
peal with regard to when the shield law should apply.
The California Supreme Court recognized a qualified newsperson's
126. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
127. Id. at 18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id at 17, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
131. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 17-18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
132. Id at 19, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
133. Id at 29, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
134. Id at 21, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
135. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
136. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
137. Id
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privilege in Mitchell v. Superior Court. 138 Mitchell stemmed from a libel
action by the Synanon Church and Charles Dederich against Reader's
Digest, David and Cathy Mitchell, David MacDonald, and Richard Of-
she.139 A Reader's Digest article, written by MacDonald, described how
the Mitchells won the Pulitzer Prize for writing materials which were
critical about Synanon. ' 40 Synanon sought documents available to the
Mitchells prior to the publication of the Reader's Digest article.' 4 ' The
superior court had ordered the Mitchells to identify all such documents
and to produce all the specific documents described in part of Synanon's
request for production of documents.142
In Mitchell, the California Supreme Court held that "in a civil ac-
tion a reporter, editor, or publisher has a qualified privilege to withhold
disclosure of the identity of confidential sources and of unpublished in-
formation supplied by such sources." 143 The scope of the qualified privi-
lege depends on the balancing of several factors: (1) the nature of the
litigation and whether the reporter is a party; (2) the relevance of the
information sought to plaintiff's cause of action; (3) a showing that plain-
tiff has exhausted all alternative sources of obtaining the needed informa-
tion; and (4) the importance of protecting confidentiality.' 44 The
supreme court called for California courts to recognize a qualified re-
porter's privilege, depending on this balancing of relevant considera-
tions. 4 ' It held that in this case the balance weighed against disclosure,
and restrained the superior court from enforcing its order requiring the
Mitchells to reveal confidential sources or information.
146
D. A Criminal Case Dealing With California's Constitutional Shield
Law Did Not Require Disclosure, Yet Weakened Shield Law
Protection
In a recent case involving the shield law in a criminal matter, the
court also used a balancing test. 147 In Hallissy v. Superior Court ("A
138. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
139. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 272, 690 P.2d at 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 153. David MacDonald
was a staff writer for Reader's Digest. The Mitchells won the Pulitzer Prize for reports and
editorials criticizing the Synanon Church. Professor Richard Ofshe wrote research papers on
the subject. Id. at 272-73, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
140. Id. at 272, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
141. Id. at 273, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
142. Id.
143. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
144. Id. at 279-83, 690 P.2d at 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61.
145. Id. at 284, 208 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
146. Id.
147. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
[Vol. I11
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Halissy "), ' the defendant, John Sapp, was charged with three counts of
murder in the first degree.' 49 Before his preliminary examination, Hal-
lissy, a reporter for the Contra Costa Times, interviewed Sapp.' She
published an article entitled "I Killed Many for Pay," based on this in-
terview with Sapp. 5' After the article appeared, the prosecutor in the
case added an additional charge of murder for financial gain to his com-
plaint against Sapp. 1 52 Sapp subpoenaed Hallissy for her notes from the
interview.1 53 Because the evidence against Sapp consisted of statements
made by him, defense counsel argued that disclosure of Hallissy's notes
was necessary to discredit Sapp by demonstrating inconsistencies in his
statements.' 54 Hallissy successfully quashed the subpoena on the basis of
shield law protection."' Upon a later motion by Sapp, the court bal-
anced the interests involved. It compared the detriment to Hallissy from
revealing her unpublished notes with the effect of nondisclosure on
Sapp's defense, and ruled in favor of Sapp.'56 When Hallissy refused to
comply with the court's order, she was held in contempt." 7
The court of appeal in Hallissy held that the shield law confers an
absolute immunity from contempt when a nonparty witness refuses to
disclose information covered under the shield law.' 58 Accordingly, the
order of contempt was set aside.'5 9 The balancing test utilized bythe
Hallissy court included the following factors: (1) whether the information
sought is relevant and necessary; (2) whether the information is available
from a source less intrusive upon a newsperson's privilege; and (3)
whether the defendant can show a reasonable possibility that the evi-
dence sought might result in his exoneration.' 6° Because Sapp had not
shown the information was necessary, and unavailable from a source less
intrusive, Hallissy was not held in contempt, and was not required to
disclose her notes.'61 However, by making disclosure in a criminal pro-
ceeding dependent upon a vague standard of relevance and necessity, the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
150. Id. at 1040-41, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
151. Id. at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
152. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
158. Id. at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
159. Id. at 1044, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
160. Id. at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (citing Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App.
3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979)).
161. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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Hallissy court opened the door for criminal defendants to argue for dis-
closure in every case.'62 The use of such a standard places the decision of
whether to compel disclosure completely within the courts' discretion,
without any clearly defined limits. This is particularly dangerous for
shield law protection in light of the courts' tendency to favor defendants
over the press in this area, as the press presents a potential threat of
interference with court proceedings.' 63
IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN DELANEY
A. Does the Term "Unpublished Information" in the California
Newsperson's Shield Law Include a Reporter's
Nonconfidential, Eyewitness Observations of an
Occurrence in a Public Place?
The California Supreme Court looked at three factors in evaluating
the scope of the shield law: (1) the language of the provision itself; 6' (2)
the legislative history of the shield law; 63 and (3) prior decisions in Cali-
fornia.' The court then concluded that "article I, section 2(b) [of the
California Constitution] is not contingent on a showing that a newsper-
son's unpublished information was obtained in confidence," and there-
fore the information at issue in Delaney was included in the definition of
material protected by the shield law. 67
1. The Language of Article 1, § 2(b)
The court said the language of article I, § 2(b) is "clear and unam-
biguous." 6 ' The provision states plainly that a reporter shall not be
cited for contempt for "refusing to disclose any unpublished informa-
tion. '' 69 The court said that the "use of the word 'any' makes clear that
[the shield law] applies to all information, regardless of whether it was
obtained in confidence."' 7 ° A restriction on the scope of article I, § 2(b)
162. See, e.g., the arguments for disclosure in Note, Pressing California Shield Law on
Criminal Defendants: A Weighting Game, 11 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 461, 478 (Spr. 1989).
163. See, e.g., Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
164. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798, 789 P.2d at 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
165. Id. at 800, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
166. Id. at 803, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
167. Id. at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
168. Id. at 798, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
169. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760 (emphasis in
original).
170. Id.
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to confidential information would "read the word 'any' out of the
section."''7
The court also looked at the definition of "unpublished information"
contained in the shield law itself,172 and saw no evidence of any explicit
or implied restriction of article I, § 2(b) to confidential information. 173 It
held that courts are not free to add provisions to what is declared clearly
in the constitution, and to limit the shield law to confidential information
would be to do just that.1" 4 Therefore, based on the shield law's plain
language, the court held that "unpublished information" is not restricted
to information obtained in confidence.
1 7 5
2. The Legislative History of the Shield Law
The Delaney court stated that the legislative history of Evidence
Code § 1070 is "beside the point" for two reasons.' 7 6 First, the language
of § 1070 and article I, § 2(b) of the California Constitution are virtually
identical. 7 7 Because the court determined that the constitutional provi-
sion was unambiguous, and its language so closely matched the statute's,
it was unnecessary to go beyond the words of the statute to extrinsic aids
such as legislative history. 178 Second, the court did not need to construe
§ 1070, but only article I, § 2(b), since the voters of California had incor-
porated the language of the statute into the California Constitution.
7 9
Delaney relied on the ballot argument in favor of Proposition 5 in
1980 to support his argument that the shield law only applies to confi-
dential information.'8 0 The court conceded that ballot arguments are
relevant as a source of voters' intent, and that the repeated references in
the argument to confidentiality may permit an inference that the shield
law only applies to confidential information.'I' The court held this infer-
ence noncompelling, however, because ballot arguments emphasize what
171. Id.
172. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b) defines "unpublished information" as "information not
disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not
related information has been disseminated and.. .whether or not published information based
upon or related to such material has been disseminated."
173. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 799, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
174. Id
175. Id at 800, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citing Lungren v.
Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (1988)).
179. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800-01, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
180. Id at 801, 789 P.2d at 943, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
181. Id at 801-02, 789 P.2d at 943-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63.
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is seen as the greatest need, and this emphasis is not to the exclusion of
other concerns.1 8 2 Further, the court refused to give the ballot argument
more weight than the actual constitutional provision.1
83
3. Prior California Decisions
The Delaney court noted that, while there was some conflict among
the courts of appeal regarding the scope of the shield law, the initial ma-
jority view was that it applied equally to nonconfidential and confidential
information.184 Only one court had previously restricted the shield law's
application to confidential information. 8 ' However, the "conflict began
to sharpen."'
' 86
Two weeks before the Delaney court held the shield law applicable
only to confidential information, a different division of the same district
held in New York Times Co. v. Superior Court that it is applicable to both
confidential and nonconfidential information. 8 7 After the supreme court
granted review in Delaney and New York Times, a third court of appeal
held that a reporter's eyewitness observations of a public event are not
protected by the shield law.'
88
Because of the conflict between the courts of appeal, the supreme
court saw little utility in a detailed review of prior cases involving the
shield law. ' 89 Instead, the court noted two themes in shield law cases: (1)
the courts which apply the shield law to all information, confidential or
not, rely on the explicit language of the shield law, whereas (2) those
which restrict the shield law to confidential information pay insufficient
attention to the law's language.' 9" The court disapproved of cases which
fall into the second category.' 9 ' The court also refused to examine public
policy, choosing to take the shield law "as they find it"-that is, clear
182. Id. at 802, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
183. Id. at 803, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
184. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763 (citing Hammarley
v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388 (1979); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court,
154 Cal. App. 3d 14 (1984); Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038 (1988)).
185. See, CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978),
rev'd, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990). See supra, notes 96-105 and accompa-
nying text.
186. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
187. Id. See also, New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (1988).
188. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803-04, 789 P.2d at 944-45, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64; Liggett v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989), overruled by Delaney v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990).
189. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 804, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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and unambiguous-and not to judge its wisdom.192
B. In the Context of a Criminal Proceeding, Can a Newsperson Be
Held in Contempt for Refusing to Disclose Information
Protected by the Shield Law?
The shield law's protection is overcome in a criminal proceeding on
a showing that nondisclosure would deprive the defendant of his federal
constitutional right to a fair trial. The reporters concede this issue.
19 3
The reporters disagreed with Delaney and the prosecution, however, on
the showing required to overcome a newsperson's claim of immunity
under the shield law.194 Delaney proposed that he must simply establish
a reasonable possibility that the evidence sought might result in his exon-
eration. 195 On the other hand, the reporters proposed that a defendant
must meet four requirements: (1) the information must go to the heart of
the case; (2) it must have a significant effect on the outcome of the case;
(3) the information is not available from alternative sources; and (4) the
infringement on the defendant's rights caused by nondisclosure must out-
weigh the newsperson's interests.
196
In formulating the proper test for accomodating these conflicting
constitutional rights, the Delaney court used the four relevant factors
identified in Mitchell v. Superior Court ' 97 ("Mitchell") as a springboard.
Those factors are: (1) the nature of the proceeding; (2) the information
must go to the heart of the case; (3) discovery should be denied unless all
alternative sources of the information have been exhausted; and (4) the
importance of protecting confidentiality.1 98 However, the Mitchell test,
formulated in a civil context, was not entirely appropriate for the situa-
tion in Delaney, a criminal proceeding.' 99
1. The Threshold Showing Required
The Delaney court examined the prevailing rule from CBS, Inc. v.
Superior Court" that a criminal defendant must demonstrate a reason-
192. Id. at 804-05, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
193. Id. at 805, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
194. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 806, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
195. Id., 789 P.2d at 946-47, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
196. Id., 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766; See also, Real Parties in Interest's Opening
Brief at 25-26.
197. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
198. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 807, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (citing Mitchell v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 279-82 (1984)).
199. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 807, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
200. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978), overruled by Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990).
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able possibility that evidence sought to be discovered might result in his
exoneration.2 "1 It also reiterated the principle that a criminal defendant
is entitled to a fair trial and intelligent defense in light of all relevant
information.2 '2 The court then held that a criminal defendant must
show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his de-
fense.20 3 The court expressed the view that this threshold showing is a
workable requirement that would uphold the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem, which depends on full disclosure of facts.2 '
The court identified three factors to clarify the application of the
Delaney standard for trial courts. First, the burden is on the defendant
to make the required showing. Second, the defendant's showing must
rest on more than speculation, but need not be detailed or specific.
Third, the defendant does not have to show that the evidence will lead to
his exoneration, but only that it will assist his defense.20 5
2. Factors to Consider
The fact that a criminal defendant meets the threshold requirement
does not mean he is automatically entitled to disclosure.' 6 The court
must also weigh the importance of protecting the unpublished informa-
tion.20 7 In doing so, the court must take into account many factors:
first, whether the information is confidential or sensitive.2 °" In other
words, would disclosure "unduly restrict the newsperson's access to fu-
ture sources and information?"2 '9 Second, the court must look at the
interests sought to be protected by the shield law. 21 0 Will the policy of the
shield law be "thwarted by disclosure?" 21 ' Third, the importance of the
information to the defendant. 2 2 If the evidence would be dispositive in
his favor, it weighs more heavily than if there is only a reasonable possi-
bility the evidence would assist his defense.2"3 Fourth, is there an alter-
201. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 807-08, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
202. Id at 808, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (quoting Hammarley v. Superior
Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979)).
203. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767 (emphasis in
original).
204. Id
205. Id at 809, 789 P.2d at 948-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
206. Id. 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
207. Id
208. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768 (emphasis added).
209. Id
210. Id 789 P.2d at 949-50, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 811, 789 P.2d at 949-50, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
212. Id, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769 (emphasis added).
213. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
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native source for the information?214 The purpose of this requirement is
to protect against unnecessary disclosure of a reporter's confidential or
sensitive information.2 15 The alternative source requirement is flexible,
and in deciding whether to impose an alternative source requirement, a
trial court should consider the nature of the information, the quality of
the alternative source, and the practicality of getting the information
from the alternative source.216 The court declined to hold that any one
factor or combination of them is determinative, choosing instead to ana-
lyze the shield law cases with their balancing test on a case-by-case
basis.217
In applying the factors to Delaney's case, the court stated that the
case "will rise or fall on the admission or not of those metal knuckles."21
In the words of the balancing test, there is a "reasonable possibility" the
reporters' testimony will assist Delaney in his defense.2 9 Delaney thus
surpassed the threshold showing.22° The court further held that the bal-
ance of the remaining factors weighed heavily in favor of compelled dis-
closure.22' The testimony is not confidential nor sensitive; there is no
suggestion that disclosure would impinge on the future newsgathering
ability of the reporters; the reporters' testimony is likely to determine the
case's outcome; and even if an exhaustion of alternative sources were a
rigid requirement, the unique nature of eyewitness testimony means there
is no alternative source.2 22
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELANEY DECISION: IS THERE
SHIELD LAW IMMUNITY FROM CONTEMPT
IN A CRIMINAL CASE?
The Delaney decision is an effort by the California Supreme Court to
reconcile conflicting cases involving reporters' claims of shield law im-
munity from contempt of court citations for refusing to disclose confi-
dential sources or unpublished information. The court recognized the
potential for the infringement of a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights if reporters are consistently able to claim immunity. The court
saw the danger a reporter's silence may mean for a criminal defendant
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 810-11, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
216. Id. at 811-13, 789 P.2d at 950-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
217. Id. at 813, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
218. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 814, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
219. Id. at 814-15, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
220. Id. at 815, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
221. Id., 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
222. Id. at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
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whose only practical source of testimony is that reporter. To deal with
these issues, the court formulated a balancing test.
The problem is that in protecting the constitutional rights of crimi-
nal defendants, the court ignored the danger the balancing test may mean
for the free press in California. If reporters are compelled to testify about
what they observe in the course of "gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public," '223 this will undoubtedly
have an effect on their future newsgathering ability. When reporters like
Kopetman and Bertero, the reporters in Delaney, are compelled to tes-
tify, they may be disadvantaged the next time they ask police officers to
let them accompany a task force on their rounds. On one hand, officers
probably will not want Kopetman "looking over their shoulders if there's
some chance that she may later dispute on the witness stand the official
version of how an arrest was made; the police may simply refuse to let
her ride along, which would deprive the public of worthwhile informa-
tion." '224 On the other hand, if Kopetman supports the police version of
the arrest, "she may be no better off; she is likely to be regarded by [Dela-
ney] and other witnesses as an arm of law enforcement." '225 Witnesses
will therefore be less willing to give her information they may have about
crimes and other events of interest to the general public. In turn, the
general public will be less informed about such events.
Reporters are frequently present at the scene of accidents and other
events giving rise to litigation.226 They are trained to observe, and report
their observations.227 If litigants are permitted to do so, they will often
subpoena reporters as witnesses.228 The impact on reporters' rights if
they are essentially used as private investigators for criminal defendants
would be severe.229
In New York Times Co. v. Superior Court 230 the California Supreme
Court considered whether the shield law's protection can be overcome in
a civil action by a litigant's showing of need for a reporter's unpublished
information.231 In New York Times, a news photographer for the Santa
Barbara News-Press took several photographs of an automobile accident
223. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West amended 1974).
224. Breaking the Shield, L.A. Times, July 20, 1988, § II, at 6, col. 1.
225. Id.
226. Real Parties in Interest's Opening Brief at 7.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), arf'd., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R.
11177 (Oct. 3, 1990).
231. New York Times, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R.'at 11177.
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involving Jerome and Joyce Sortomme.232 Two of the pictures were pub-
lished in the newspaper; the rest were not.233 The Sortommes filed a
products liability action against Volkswagen, and a negligence action
against the State of California.13 1 Volkswagen subpoenaed the News-
Press for production of the unpublished photographs. 235 The trial court,
after an in camera inspection of the photographs, ordered the News-
Press to produce the photographs.236 The court of appeal held the shield
law protects nonparty journalists in civil litigation from being compelled
to disclose unpublished information.2 37 The supreme court held that the
case was unlike Delaney,238 in which they found a need to balance a re-
porter's interests against a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.239
However, in a footnote the court acknowledged the possibility that "in a
future case a civil litigant seeking discovery from a nonparty newsperson
might have either a state or federal constitutional right that would have
to be weighed against a claim of immunity under the shield law. ' '2 ' De-
laney demonstrated the threat such a weighing of interests poses for
newspersons' immunity from contempt in criminal proceedings. The
court's footnote in New York Times illustrates that this threat is a perva-
sive one. The door is now open for courts to strike down shield law
immunity in both criminal and civil proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The description of "shield law" conjures up visions of broad protec-
tion and sweeping privilege. 241 At first glance, the California Supreme
Court in Delaney appears to support this vision, by broadening shield law
protection beyond that provided by the court of appeal in the same case.
The supreme court overturned the lower court's ruling that nonconfiden-
tial eyewitness observations are not subject to the shield law. In the final
analysis, though, Delaney destroys the vision of broad protection and
sweeping privilege. The California Supreme Court has offered reporters
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. New York Times, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 11177.
237. Id.
238. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, rev. granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 277, 762 P.2d
441, reprinted for tracking pending review, as Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d
681, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988), superseded by 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1990).
239. New York Times, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 11178.
240. Id. at 11180, n.ll.
241. KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1982).
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neither protection nor privilege. Its decision renders the constitutionally
provided shield protection superfluous, by effectively disabling the shield
law in criminal matters.
Delaney also set the stage for disabling the shield law in civil mat-
ters. While the supreme court upheld shield law protection in a civil
matter a few months after Delaney, 2 42 the fact that the court noted in a
footnote that the protection may not always be upheld in civil cases dem-
onstrates the decreasing value of the shield law for reporters.
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